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I .  1. INTRODUCTION 
This final report  contains the resul ts  of the F Y  1973 NASA Study 2 .  I 
performed under contract NASW-2472. This study, entitled "DOD/NASA 
System Impact Analysis, 
approximately two man-years ,  was to consist  of ad hoc system analyses a s  
required,  a Tug Turnaround Cost Study, and a Tug Refurbishment Logistics 
Concepts Study. No ad hoc studies were  initially specified. 
direction was given by NASA to conclude the Tug Turnaround Cost Study and 
to initiate a Space Transportation System (STS) Abort Modes and Effects Study 
In January 1973,  additional direction was given to update a Space Shuttle 
Explosive Equivalency Study which had been accomplished under contract 
NASW-2 129 in F Y  1971. 
considered an ad hoc study but was covered by additional funding from the 
NASA Space Shuttle P rogram Office. 
Study was retained a s  a replacement for the terminated Tug Turnaround Cost  
Study. 
because the manpower allocated to Study 2. I was expended, with NASA 
concurrence,  in expediting t h e  completion (to 29 November 1972 f rom March 
1973)  of the Tug Turnaround Cost Study and in performing the STS Abort 
Modes and Effects Study. Results of the Tug Turnaround and STS Abort 
Studies a r e  contained herein while the results of the Explosive Equivalency 
Study a r e  reported separately. 
as originally proposed and negotiated a t  a level of 
In October 1972,  
The Space Shuttle Explosive Equivalency Study was 
The STS Abort Modes and Effects 
The Tug Refurbishment Logistics Concepts Study was never initiated 
. 
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2. STUDY OBsT KCTIVES 
* 
The overall  objective of this study, "DOD/NASA System Impact Analysis, I '  
was to conduct selected engineering and cost  analyses regarding the elements 
of the Space Transportation System (STS). 
duction, a Tug Turnaround Cost Study and an  STS Abort Modes and Effects 
Study were  conducted. The objective of the Tug Turnaround Cost Study was to 
extend the resul ts  of a Tug Refurbishment Cost Study completed in F Y  1972 to 
include all other  cos ts  related to  turnaround. 
Modes and Effects Study was to identify the effects and impacts of abort  on the 
flight and ground elements of the STS, viz., the Orbiter,  Tug, Payloads, 
Ground Support, and Flight Support including Facil i t ies and Equipments. 
Specifically, as  noted in the Intro- 
The objective of the STS Abort 
I .  
-2 - 
3. T U G  TURNAROUND COST STUDY 
A. 
1. STUDY APPROACH 
METHOD OF APPROACH AND PRINCIPAL ASSUMPTIONS 
As previously noted, the major  objective of the study was to develop 
a Tug turnaround cost  estimate;  however, it was also necessary  to retain the 
perspective of the Tug turnaround cos ts  within the context of overall  Tug 
operations costs. 
addressed. 
As a result, each of the following cost  elements was 
a. 
b. 
C. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g-  
h. 
i. 
j. 
k. 
Launch Operations 
Recovery Operations 
Command and Control 
Replacement Training 
Facility and Equipment Maintenance 
Vehicle Maintenance 
Engineering Support 
P rogram Integration and Management 
Follow-On Spares 
Propellants and Gases 
Range/Base Support. 
These elements constitute the total  Tug operations costs  and a r e  
identical in definition and content to the cost  estimating relationships (CERs) 
developed in a joint NASA/DOD-funded Space Transportation System (STS) 
Cost  Methodology Study! It w a s  not the objective of this study to update o r  in 
any way modify the CERs; their definition and content were retained only for  
consistency and traceability, 
~- 
'STS Cost Methodology, Volume 11, Orbit -to -Orbit Shuttle, 
TOR -0059(6759 -04) -1, The Aerospace Corporation (August 1970). 
- 3  - 
A significant portion of the turnaround and pre-flight costs  for  a 
reusable Tug is the refurbishment cost .  
study conducted for NASA Headquarters in F Y  1972. 
Cost Study was an extension of the Tug Refurbishment Study, the results of the 
refurbishment study were used directly as cos t  inputs in the a r e a s  of vehicle 
maintenance and follow-on spares.  
This was the subject of an in-depth 
Since this Tug Turnaround 
4 
2. GROUND RULES/GUIDELINES 
The following is a listing of the overall  ground rules/guidelines used 
in the conduct of this study. 
a. The baseline Tug is that which resulted f rom the F Y  1972 Tug 
Refurbishment Cost Study. 
The combined NASA/DOD mission model contains 304 Tug 
flights over a 12-year period with an approximate launch rate  
of two pe r  month from KSC and one every two months f rom 
VAFB. 
c .  The definition for  each cos t  element analyzed is a s  stated 
in  the STS Cost Methodology Study. 
d. NASA is assumed to be the host at KSC and DOD is assumed 
to be the host at VAFB. 
Tug maintenance facilities will exist at KSC and VAFB. 
Normal  and contingency operations a r e  considered in Tug 
turnaround operations. 
Separate estimates for IOC (first 20 flights) and full 
operational capability (OC) a r e  presented where appropriate. 
Cost  es t imates  a r e  in  1971 dollars (multiply by 1. 07 to obtain 
1973 dollars).  
b. 
e. 
f. 
g. 
h. 
B. BASIC DATA GENERATED AND SIGNIFICANT RESULTS 
1. BACKGROUND 
During F Y  1972 a Tug Refurbishment Cost Est imate  was developed 
f o r  a reusable cryogenic propellant Tug. 
Study 2.4 of contract  NASW-2301, consisted of an in-depth analysis of the 
scheduled and unscheduled refurbishment costs  of a representative Space Tug. 
This effort, conducted as pa r t  of 
i 
4 
'Analysis of Space Tug Operating Techniques - Final Report (Study 2. 4), Vol. 11, 
ATR-73(7314)-1, The Aerospace Corporation (August 1972). 
0 
-4 - 
0 The Tug Turnaround Cost Study reported herein is the extension of the Tug 
Refurbishment Study to include other direct  and indirect ground operations 
costs  that a r e  incurred in  the turnaround cycle. Additionally, a l l  other 
remaining operations cost  elements a r e  assessed  to present a complete 
picture of the total expected operations costs  of the Space Tug. 
2. SCOPE 
. 
The Tug Turnaround Cost Study was intended to be a bottoms-up cost 
es t imate  of all Tug operational cost elements,  with resu l t s  available approxi- 
mately six months af ter  contract NASW-2472 go-ahead. 
accelerated to completion i n  two and one-half months because of the higher 
pr ior i ty  of the Abort Modes and Effects Study. 
terminated at  this inter im milestone producing operations costs which were  
derived by a mixture of bottoms -up and historically-based parametr ic  costs, 
i. e. , cost  estimating relationships (CERs). 
This study was  
As a result ,  the study was 
3 .  RESULTS 
During the F Y  1972 Tug Refurbishment Cost Study of contract 
NASW -230i, it was recognized that maintenance and refurbishment repre-  
sented only a portion of the total ground turnaround costs.  
noted herein utilized the F Y  1972 Tug maintenance and refurbishment costs  
augmented by an analysis of the additional direct  and indirect operational 
cos ts  required to support the ground turnaround cycle of a Tug. 
conduct of the study and in  keeping with the Statement of Work al l  operational 
cos t  elements were  assessed for the purpose of understanding Tug turn- 
around costs  within the context of overall  Tug operations costs.  
i 
The resul ts  
In the 
To realistically a s s e s s  the operational costs  a s  a function of the 
maturi ty  of the sys tem two time f rames  of reference were defined: an 
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) consisting of approximately 2 0 flights, 
and a full Operational Capability (OC) following IOC for the remainder of the 
12 -year mission model. These definitions were utilized in the predecessor  
. 
-5 - 
. 
Tug Refurbishment Cost Study and were therefore ca r r i ed  into this study. 
Another carryover  of significance was the use of a "dedicated" Tug ground 
crew at  each launch site of 52 men for IOC and 37 men for  OC. 
s izes  were  determined in  the Refurbishment Study by analyzing the necessary 
operations and s k i l l  mix required f o r  maintenance and refurbishment. 
review of the crew mix for  this study revealed that the previously determined 
crews were  sufficient to per form all ground operations. 
"dedicated" Tug crew concept was also adopted for this study as opposed to 
a manpower pool. 
Shuttle and Tug ground crews  were combined into a manpower pool. 
recommended that this be considered in any follow-on study. 
These crew 
A 
As a result ,  the 
It is recognized that a cost savings might resul t  if the 
It is 
The major  findings of this study a r e  presented in Tables 3-1  (Direct 
Operating Costs), 3 -2 (Indirect Operating Costs),  3 -3 (Institutional Base Costs),  
and 3-4 (Cost Estimate Summary),  
can vary,  i. e . ,  with o r  without indirect costs,  launch cos t s ,  e tc . ,  the 
following overall  conclusions a r e  presented which combine the Tug turn- 
around related operations costs  in  various ways. 
As the definition of Tug turnaround cost  
a. The total direct  costs of an average' Tug turnaround, i. e . ,  
landing-to-launch, a r e  $519K and $342K for  the IOC and OC 
phases of the flight program, respectively. 
b. The total  direct  operational costs for Tug missions,  i. e . ,  
launch-to -launch including flight operations, a r e  $665K and 
$386K for  IOC and OC, respectively. 
c. The total  d i rec t  and indirect operational costs  for Tug 
missions,  i. e. , launch-to -launch including flight operations, 
a r e  $1, 020K a n d ' m  for  IOC and OC, respectively. 
The average turnaround costs  reported herein combine KSC and WTR 
operational costs  and launch rates. 
1 
- 6 -  
I .  
d. A dedicated Tug ground crew at KSC of 37 men of 
appropriate skil ls  is sufficient to perform al l  Tug-related 
ground operations f o r  the maximum expected launch rate  
of two per  month (OC). 
e. The necessity for a s imi la r  37-man crew at WTR combined 
with its significantly lower Tug launch rate  of one every 
two months (6 p e r  year )  could result  in significantly higher 
actual costs pe r  flight a t  WTR. 
f. Government (NASA, DOD, etc. ) and non-government u s e r  
costs  may differ significantly due to government policy on 
the apportionment of many indirect costs to the non-govern- 
ment user .  It is recommended that this be pursued in  any 
subsequent effort. 
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4. STS ABORT MODES AND EFFECTS STUDY 
A. METHOD OF APPROACH AND PRINCIPAL ASSUMPTIONS 
The overall  objective of this study was to a s ses s  the major  effects 
and impacts of abort  on the f l i gh t  and ground elements of the STS, viz., the 
Orbiter,  Tug, Payload, Ground Support, and Flight Support including Facilities 
and Equipments. The main emphasis of this study was  on the identification of 
Tug-related abort  effects and impacts, i. e. ,  those that a r e  caused by the Tug 
and those that affect the Tug. 
with either degraded main engine thrust  o r  reaction control system thrust  
was analyzed a s  a special emphasis task. 
to a s s e s s  the data management system requirements fo r  performing al l  Tug- 
related abort  decisions and operations on board the Tug vehicle. 
The performance capability of the Tug vehicle 
Also, a cursory analysis was made 
The approach used in this assessment  was to first define the baseline 
STS elements and a baseline mission. 
f rom information presented by North American Rockwell in their  November 
1972 Space Shuttle System Summary and P rogram Requirements Review 
Briefings. 
June 26, 1972, "Baseline Tug Definition Document. I '  Since the payloads to 
be put into orbi t  by the STS a r e  many and diverse,  representative sys tems/  
subsystems were considered; however, no particular baseline design was 
assumed. 
1361 kg (3000 lb)  payload replacement mission. 
Shuttle vehicle definition was obtained a 
The Tug vehicle definition was obtained from the NASA MSFC 
The mission used for this assessment  was a geosynchronous 
Abort regimes were then defined for  all  phases of the baseline 
mission f rom liftoff to reentry. The next s tep was to determine the gross  
effects  on the STS elements of an assumed abort  producing failure in each 
flight element for  each abort regime. 
abort  problem and ensured that all general  categories of abort  were addressed. 
The next s tep in the assessment  was to define the actual failure o r  failure 
! 
This s tep provided an overview of the 
. 
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m o d r s  and then relatc thcsc to impacts on the STS clcments. 
state of the design of the Orbiter and Tug vehicles and the many diversified 
payloads that a r e  planned to be orbited by the STS, a detailed analysis of all 
the possible failure modes of these STS elements w a s  not attempted. 
fore, the failure analysis w a s  limited to a gross  assessment  of the possible 
failure modes and hazards and was made with the following limitations and 
assumptions: (1)  the cause of failure was generally not isolated beyond the 
subsystem level, ( 2 )  no numerical  probabilities were calculated, and 
( 3 )  only payload types that require a Tug mission for payload replacement 
were considered. 
Because of the 
There- 
F o r  the special emphasis task to determine Tug performance with 
degraded thrust  levels, a six degree of freedom flight simulation computer 
program was utilized. Both intact (with payload) and jettisoned payload 
aborts  were  analyzed. F o r  the autonomous abort assessment ,  functional 
requirements for Tug autonomous abort  capability were defined and their 
impact on the design of the Tug on-board data management system was 
assessed. 
made, together with a projection of flight computer capability in the 1976-80 
time frame. 
Rough estimates of software and hardware requirements were 
B. BASIC DATA GENERATED AND SIGNIFICANT RESULTS 
1. ABORT IMPACTS 
The resultant major effects and impacts on the STS elements of an 
abort-producing failure in one of the flight elements a r e  presented in Table 4-1. 
These a r e  related to either the design of the elements o r  operational proce- 
dures. The main design impacts on the elements a r e  summarized below. 
a. An abort  during the Shuttle ascent phase of the mission 
impacts both the Orbiter and Tug design. 
mus t  be designed to land with a full load of Tug propellants 
o r  provide for  rapid dumping. 
A failure in the baseline Tug electrical  power supply (single 
fuel cell)  could result in the loss  of the Tug and its payload. 
These vehicles 
b. 
. 
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. c. Orbiter aborts a f te r  Tug deployment could resul t  in the 
requirement to extend the quiescent on-orbit Tug capability. 
A Tug failure could result in payload abandonment in an 
off-nominal orbit. 
Altered flow of flight elements through the ground turnaround 
cycle due to a mission abort  may tax the capabilities of the 
ground facilities. 
Par t ia l  mission completion m a y  be possible in the event of 
a Tug main engine failure by using ei ther  Tug main engine idle 
mode o r  reaction control system thrust. The reaction control 
system requires access to the main propellants in order  to 
provide the required AV. The baseline Tug design used for  
this assessment  does not have this feature. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
2. TUG ABORT PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY 
During the conduct of the abort  effects assessment ,  i t  was recog- 
nized that the Tug main propulsion system represented a significant single 
point failure mode. 
. .  
A special emphasis task was conducted therefore to 
analyze 
levels. 
payload 
the mission performance capability of the Tug a t  degraded thrust  
The mission used for this analysis was  the baseline geosynchronous 
replacem'ent mission. The nominal Tug mission consists of the 
following six burns: 
a. 
b. 
C. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
The f i r s t  burn injects the Tug into a t ransfer  orbit with 
apogee at  synchronous altitude. 
The second burn circularizes the orbit  a t  synchronous 
altitude. 
After deploying the f i r s t  payload, the Space Tug performs a 
third burn (actually a s e r i e s  of burns) to accomplish on-orbit 
phasing and retrieve a second payload. 
With the second payload attached, a fourth burn i s  performed 
to lower the Tug's perigee altitude. 
A s  the Tug approaches perigee, a fifth burn is executed to 
produce a phasing orbit. 
The sixth burn circularizes the Tug orbit. 
. 
- 1 5 -  
Loss of the nominal Tug thrust level of 44 ,482  N (10, 000 lb) was 
assumed to occur pr ior  to any one of the six burns. 
dered were: 
Fai lure  modes consi- 
- 
a. Only the main engine idle mode thrust  of 4448 N (1000 lb) 
was available. 
Only the Reaction Control System (RCS) thrust  of 534 N 
(120 lb) was available. 
b. 
The capability of the Tug in a degraded thrus t  condition is summa- 
rized in Table 4-2. 
which fuel is exhausted in attempting to re turn to the Orbiter i s  given. 
lines in place of an entry indicate that an alternative is meaningless. 
If an abort mission cannot be completed, the orbi t  in 
Dash 
A s  indicated in Table 4-2 ,  portions of the mission can be performed 
in the event of a main engine failure provided there  is idle mode o r  RCS 
thrust  available. 
capabilities of the two alternate thrust modes a r e  the same except that the 
idle mode thrust  can bring the Tug and its payload back to a lower ear th  
orbi t  in the case  of an intact abort. If a failure occurs in the main ag ine  
p r io r  to obtaining the mission orbit, a deploy-only mission can be completed 
using the idle mode thrust  but not with the RCS thrust. 
After the mission orbi t  has been obtained, the performance 
3. TUG AUTONOMOUS ABORT ASSESSMENT 
The ground support necessary fo r  the STS elements during an abort  
A situation is dependent on the on-board capabilities of the flight elements. 
prel iminary assessment  was made to determine the data management system 
requirements for  incorporating an autonomous abort  capability into the 
unmanned Tug vehicle. 
The data storage requirements and computing power needed to 
control the Tug through i t s  baseline mission can be estimated with some 
degree of confidence by a straightforward extension of some cur ren t  flight 
programs.  
defined. 
nominal performance is  distressingly large,  and the decision processes  
The problem of dealing with non-nominal conditions is less well 
The number of ways in which a complex system can exhibit non- 
. 
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required to evaluate their  impact on mission performance i s  correspondingly 
complex. An examination of existing ground programs which perform subsets 
of the complex system readiness, mission planning, and mission verification 
functions provides an estimate of the computer storage requirements for 
these functions. 
puter size of 64K words would be  adequate for all Tug functions including 
autonomous abort. 
The resul ts  of the cursory  assessment  indicate that a com- 
Other technical factors governing the design of the Tug on-board data 
management system include computing speed, size,  weight, power consumption, 
and reliability. 
postulated to be available in the 1976- 1980 time frame. 
a r e  summarized a s  follows: 
These factors  must be considered in t e rms  of the technology 
These character is t ics  
Memory Capacity 
Computing Speeds 
64K 32-bit words (access  time 
0. 3 psec)  
Add time < 1  psec 
Mult Time < 5  psec 
Volume <0.056 m3 ( 2  ft3) 
Weight < 22.5 kg (50 lb)  
. 
Power Consumption -275 w 
-18- 
5. SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL EFFORT 
A. TUG TURNAROUND COSTS 
The Tug Turnaround Cost Study, being an extension of the previously 
completed Tug Refurbishment Cost Study, was limited to a single Tug configu- 
ration, i. e . ,  high performance, cryogenic propellant, reusable Tug. It is 
recommended that the operational costs of the following Tug candidate concepts 
be studied to be compatible with alternate Tug concepts currently being analyzed 
by the NASA and DOD. 
a. 
b. Storable propellant reusable Tug 
c. Modified existing upper stages. 
Phased developed cryogenic propellant Tugs 
As a resul t  of this study several  cost-driver a r e a s  were identified i which warrant  further in-depth study i r respect ive of the Tug concept selected. 
These a r e a s  a r e  discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. 
1. INDIRECT OPERATIONS COSTS 
Indirect Tug Operations Costs include Facility and Equipment Mainte - 
nance, Replacement Training, Engineering Support, and Program Integration 
and Management. Of the operations costs,  the cost-driver a r e a s  of Tug 
Equipment Maintenance and Engineering Support accounted for a lmost  40 
percent of the total direct  and indirect per  flight operations costs.  
recur r ing  nature of the costs,  which a r e  somewhat independent of launch rate ,  
necessitated an assumption of average launch rate to establish per  flight 
costs.  
ing these indirect cost-driver a reas  and the applicability of these costs  a s  
u s e r  o r  institutional base costs.  
The 
It is recommended that a comprehensive study be conducted regard-  
-19 - 
2. TUG REFURBISHMENT LOGISTICS CONCEPTS 
I -  
8 .  
A s  noted in the Introduction, this study was originally planned to be 
accomplished within this contract  following the accomplishment of the Tug 
Turnaround Cost Study. It was not accomplished due to the pr ior i ty  of other 
studies; however, i t  is recommended that i t  be considered in any subsequent 
effort. 
ships between NASA, DOD, and the various Tug contractors,  i. e . ,  vehicle, 
facilities, equipment, etc. Additionally, the effect of the Shuttle equipment 
and personnel a t  the same launch facilities should be addressed. 
the study is needed to a s s e s s  various approaches to Tug logistics. 
concepts concerning the approach to vehicle maintenance should be identified. 
The question of who will perform the maintenance and the impact on the total 
program should be addressed, e. g., private contractor versus  the use  of a 
government organization to perform vehicle maintenance. 
funding level and the level of support required a t  the manufacturer for various 
approaches to spares  support should be identified, i. e., al l  spares  purchased 
a t  the beginning of the program or purchased over a longer t ime span. 
Major a r e a s  that should be addressed include the logistic relation- 
Specifically, 
Various 
The impact on the 
B. STS ABORT MODES AND EFFECTS 
The impacts on the various elements of an abort-producing failure 
in one of the STS flight elements represent design features and requirements 
that may o r  may not be practical  o r  desirable to implement. The impact on 
the Orbiterof an abort  during the ascent phase of the Shuttle flight is 'dependent 
on whether o r  not there i s  enough time to dump the Tug propellants. 
study would be required to determine whether the Orbiter should provide for 
propellant dump, design for the added payload weight, o r  accept a reduction in 
the s t ructure  safety factors. 
to be considered. 
capability was in the process of being revised, i. e . ,  the capability for  thrust  
terminating the solid rocket motors was deleted. 
increase in the minimum time f o r  propellant dump. 
capabilities a r e  adequately defined, no definite design impacts can be deter-  
mined. 
A t rade 
The impacts on the Tug vehicle would also have 
At the t ime of the writing of this report ,  the Shuttle abort  
This should resul t  in an 
Until the Shuttle abort 
-20-  
1 
In the event of an Orbiter failure whichnecessitates the early re turn 
of the Orbiter pr ior  to Tug retrieval, the Tug may be required to  remain on 
orbit longer than anticipated. 
re t r ieval  and the Orbiter required two weeks to be refurbished and processed 
through the ground turnaround cycle, then the Tug would have to stay on orbit  
an additional two weeks i f  no other Orbiter were  available. The baseline Tug 
has approximately seven days on-orbit capability. Hence, some of the Tug 
systems, e. g . ,  e lectr ical  power and propellant supply fo r  attitude control, 
would require additional capability to survive the added time on orbit. 
degree to which this added capability should be incorporated and the resultant 
impact on the Tug design should be the subject of a study. 
If the failure occurred just  pr ior  to Tug 
The 
The main impact on the payload resul ts  f rom a Tug failure which 
requires  the Tug to jettison the payload in an off-nominal orbit. 
payload would have to survive in this orbit  until re t r ieval  by a subsequent 
Tug flight. The impact on the payload is a function of the difference between 
the design orbit  and the off-nominal orbit, i. e . ,  i f  the payload were designed 
to operate at  synchronous altitude but instead the payload were deployed in 
a low ear th  orbit  the difference in the heat input f rom the earth 's  albedo and 
the sun m a y  resul t  in damage to the payload. 
should be designed to account for  the possibility of an off-nominal orbit  inser -  
tion should be the subject of a trade study which would address  the probability 
of this  occurrence and the impact on the subsystems in various payloads. 
Hence, the 
0 
Whether o r  not the payload 
The preliminary analysis of data management system requirements 
for Tug autonomous abort  capability has  permitted a general  definition of the 
scope of the problem and the development of some broad guidelines for further 
s teps  in the systems analysis/development process.  
uncertainty factor in determining the overall  feasibility of incorporating 
an autonomous abort  capability in the Tug data management system is the 
question a s  to the degree to which the functions now performed by human 
The greatest  single 
beings in the a r e a s  of fault diagnosis, mission plan generation, and mission 
plan verification should be automated. This question should be addressed in 
any follow-on effort. 
. 
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APPENDIX A 
STUDY 2.1 
DOD/NASA SYSTEMS IMPACT ANALYSIS 
STATEMENT OF WORK 
The Statement of Work, extracted f rom Request for  Proposal No. 
W10-12296-DHC-3, is repeated below for the convenience of the reader.  
"2. 1 
The contractor shall analyze the relative effectiveness of advanced STS 
programs identified by NASA. 
consideration of a s  many separable technical i s sues  a s  possible which a r e  
related to the impact of the NASA-identified alternative programs on potential 
DOD technical requirements. In addition, the contractor shall  provide NASA 
with a s  broad a technical understanding a s  possible of potential DOD program 
requirements and options a s  they might affect NASA planning. 
DOD/NASA System Impact Analysis 
The contractor shall include in his analyses 
2. 1. 1 Systems Analysis 
The contractor 's  system analysis effort shall include consideration of technical, 
economic and programmatic factors, development schedules, growth potential 
and sensitivity to program changes. 
the systems analysis, the contractor shall  conduct conceptual design/analysis 
activities in sufficient depth to establish f i r s t -order  verification of the hypo- 
thesized program benefit and to identify the resulting vehicle implications. 
The contractor shall  continue his cognizance over NASA and DOD-sponsored 
space vehicle and operations studies related to the Space Transportation 
System (STS) and shall identify areas  of technical o r  economic uncertainty 
which require the conduct of advanced program studies for  resolution. 
Where potential benefits a r e  suggested by 
-22 - 
The contractor 
listing below: 
shall per form system analysis in a r e a s  typified by the task 
2. 1.1. 1 
performance and physical character is t ics  variations which might be encountered, 
and provide design decision optimization data for use in developing a balanced 
strategy between performance optimization and downstream program growth. 
2. 1. 1 .2  Identify those program a r e a s  which a r e  most  likely to require 
change, and the preventive o r  remedial program management actions which 
would reduce the impact of changes on program performance, schedules and 
costs.  
2. 1. 1 . 3  
timely insight into program trends. 
2. 1. 1.4 
techniques, and evaluation of the impact of these techniques on subsystems 
cos ts  and procurement strategy. 
2. 1. 1.5 
assessment  of the potential program benefit occurring f rom candidate 
improvements. 
2. 1. 1. 6 
2. 1. 2 DOD Applications of a NASA Designed Tug/Transfer  Stage 
The contractor shall  utilize his familiarity with Tug/Transfer  Stage design 
options and with DOD mission applications to provide NASA with a continuing 
assessment  of the capability of a NASA designed Tug/Transfer  Stage to 
per form DOD missions. Based upon the assessment ,  the contractor shall  
identify and describe modifications required to  ensure that the developed Tug 
w i l l  have maximum compatibility with DOD missions. Typical of the tasks  to 
be performed in this study activity a re :  
Conduct vehicle sensivitity analysis which wil l  identify potential 
Identify program control techniques which will provide maximum 
< 
Conduct analysis of space subsystems refurbishment and repair  
Identify potential product improvement a r e a s  and provide an 
Identify and evaluate potential new space Shuttle applications. 
. 
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2. 1. 2.1 
de sign studies and recommend appropriate study tasks. 
The contractor shall maintain cognizance of NASA directed Tug 
2. 1.2.2 
requirements on the specific NASA Tug /Transfer  Stage design( s). 
Conduct in-house studies to determine the impact of DOD-unique 
2. 1. 2. 3 
attrition rates ,  to be developed as a par t  of this task, and evaluate production 
strategies a s  a means to incorporate product improvement changes a t  minimum 
expense. 
Develop Tug fleet buy strategies based on established estimated 
2. 1.2.4 Develop Tug subsystem failure detection, contingency action 
concepts and operations techniques. 
2. 1.2.5 Identify and develop techniques for monitoring, and controlling 
the Tug while in close proximity to the Shuttle. 
tion of the required Tug and cooperating Shuttle subsystems. 
This should include a descrip- 
2. 1. 2. 6 
concepts together with the costs. 
Tug subsystem procurement strategy during the Tug development and opera- 
tional phases. 
Conduct analyses of Tug subsystem refurbishment and repair  
Evaluate the impact of these concepts on 0 
2. 1.2.7 
tion of the conceptual subsystems a s  they affect DOD mission operations, and 
identification of the DOD-preferred flight operations and support systems 
(including the mission control process). 
Evaluate DOD Tug operations concepts, such a s  the identifica- 
2. 1. 2 .8  
(launch- to-launch) concepts. 
post-flight safing, refurbishment and repair ,  and pre-launch checkout and 
support activities. I '  
Develop comprehensive cost  estimates for Tug turnaround 
These should include recovery and return,  
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